RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE
STANDARDIZATION OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY
BY JASON BELMONT CONN

“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean
only one thing -- one person, one vote.”
-- Chief Justice Earl Warren (1963)1

INTRODUCTION: AMBIGUITIES WITHOUT ANSWERS
On November 3, 2004,2 Senator John Kerry conceded the presidential election to
President George W. Bush,3 and the nation exhaled a deep sigh of relief that the presidential
election would not end in another lengthy and contentious legal battle like the one that cast a
dark cloud over the 2000 presidential election.4 Although his decision to forgo litigation helped
unify a politically divided nation in the wake of a contentious election cycle,5 Kerry also closed
the door on a judicial dissection of the balloting process and a potential opportunity for the
Supreme Court to revisit many of the lingering questions from its controversial and tangled
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Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
The election was held on November 2, 2004. However, as Americans went to sleep that night, the
election was still too close to call given the close margins of victory in a number of key states. See
Tracy Grant, Election Is Too Close to Call, WASHINGTON POST, C15, Nov. 3, 2004.
3
See Nagourney, Bush Voices Pride, Humility and Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004.
4
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Jeffrey Toobin, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX-DAY
BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000 ELECTION (2001); Alan M. Dershowitz, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE
HIGH COURT HIJACKED THE NATION (2000); Richard A. Posner, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
5
Senator Kerry said: “In America, it is vital that every vote count . . . But the outcome should be
decided by voters, not a protracted legal fight.” Charles Hurt, As Night Wore On, Glee Became
Gloom, WASHINGTON TIMES, A11, Nov. 4, 2004.
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decision in Bush v. Gore.6
In this article, I examine one of these lingering questions: Does Bush v. Gore and the
relevant equal protection case law open the door for an equal protection challenge to a state’s use
of different voting machines/technologies and how do the racial disparities in error rates impact
this analysis?7 As we reflect on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,8 and the
fortieth anniversary of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,9 and legal scholars continue to debate the
lessons, value, and legacy of these landmark accomplishments of the civil rights movement, it
seems particularly important to continue scrutinizing our electoral process to ensure that all
Americans are not only given equal access to the ballot, but also an opportunity to uniformly
impact who is elected to serve as our representatives. Standardization of voting technologies at

6

See Hurt, supra note 5. A group of prominent House Democrats, including Rep. John Conyers of
Michigan, strongly objected to the counting of Ohio’s electoral votes in the 2004 election and
encouraged legal challenges. See Amy Fagan, Kerry Rebuffs Protest of Ohio Electors, WASHINGTON
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005.
7
Following Bush v. Gore, one scholar published a self-proclaimed “short Essay” in 2001 noting the
“significance of the racial disparities reflected in machine-rejected ballots.” Given developments in
the case law and political science data regarding these disparities since 2001, this issue deserves
greater scrutiny. See Spencer Overton, Symposium: The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the
Wake of Florida 2000: A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 469 (2001).
8
347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]; see, e.g., Genna Rae McNeil, Essay: Before Brown:
Reflections On Historical Context and Vision, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 1431 (2003); Honorable Robert M.
Bell, Chief Judge, Ct. of Apps. of MD, Speech: Journey To Justice: Fiftieth Anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2004); Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Multiple Ironies: Brown
at 50, 47 HOW. L.J. 29 (2003).
9
Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1973
(2000)); see Karyn L. Bass, Note & Comment, Are We Really Over the Hill Yet? The Voting Rights
Act at Forty Years: Actual and Constructive Disenfranchisement in the Wake of Election 2000 and
Bush v. Gore, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 111 (2004).
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the state-level is central to accomplishing this goal.10
Given the current partisan political divide in the country,11 the documented closeness of
recent elections at all governmental levels,12 and the recognized impact that a single vote or
single jurisdiction’s returns can have on our national elections,13 the Court should strictly apply
“one person, one vote” to the jurisprudence on election machines. Whereas the courts have been
willing to scrutinize reapportionment plans to ensure that electoral districts are unexceptionally
even,14 the courts have largely looked the other way when confronted with one of the largest
threats to the ideal that every person’s vote counts equally: Errors in voting machine technology
10

According to Election Data Services, “Over the years, several states have moved to establish
uniform voting systems. Oklahoma led the way by establishing a uniform optical scan voting system
in the early 1990s. Delaware’s three counties have used electronic systems since 1996. Hawaii and
Rhode Island established uniform optical scan systems in 1998. Georgia established a uniform
electronic voting system in 2002. Nevada will establish a uniform electronic voting system in 2004;
Maryland, in 2006. Although Maryland’s uniform system won’t be fully implemented until 2006, all
24 election jurisdictions, including the city of Baltimore, are expected to use some type of electronic
system in 2004.” “New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use Electronic Voting Systems, 32
Million Still with Punch Cards in 2004,” Election Data Services, Press Release, available at
http://www.electiondataservices.com/content/votingequipment.htm.
11
For example, in 2000, the United States had the closest presidential election in the modern history
of the Electoral College. On election night, the national news media first declared Vice President Al
Gore the winner, only to extract the prediction a few hours later. Eventually, George W. Bush would
be declared the winner, but only after five weeks of legal debates, recounts, and political mayhem.
The 2000 election was the first time in over 100 years that the candidate who won the Electoral
College and the election, was not the candidate that won the popular vote. See Jeffrey Toobin, TOO
CLOSE TO CALL (2001). The 2000 and 2004 election showed that there is currently no overwhelming
mandate for either party’s political platform.
12

See Jason Belmont Conn, The Partisan Politics of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (2003)
(unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, Cornell University), at 58, available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/connfvr.pdf.
13
See Tim Jones & Andrew Zajac, Vote Ordeal for Ohio Begins, Ends in the Dark, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, C12, Nov. 3, 2004; see also Chris McGann, Gregoire Sworn In Amid Legal Challenge,
SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan.
13,
2005,
available
at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/207695_governor13.html (discussing the closeness of the 2004
Washington State Governor’s race).
14
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); for a discussion of the court’s entrance into the
“political thicket” of reapportionment and gerrymandering, see Daniel R. Ortiz, Symposium, The
Law of Democracy: Redistricting: Case Law and Consequences: Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
459 (2004).
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compromising one’s vote do not strike evenly across type of voting machine, and the error rates
within a state often correlate with race and socioeconomic status.
The Supreme Court hinted in Bush v. Gore that it wanted Congress and the state
legislatures to address the problems associated with varying voting technology,15 but it is time
for the Supreme Court to hand down a mandate and force each state to use the same voting
technology.16 This article suggests that one legacy and lesson of Brown v. Board of Education17
is that giving the nation’s legislatures leeway to rectify serious constitutional inadequacies “with
all deliberate speed” is a formula for failure; the court must mandate change.18 In mandating
standardization, the Court will protect “one person, one vote” and ensure voting equality across
race.

15

See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide
will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting”).

16

The argument in this paper focuses on standardization at the state level, as opposed to national
standardization. States have always had the power to regulate elections. Given the individualities of
elections in each state, a single type of machine might not work for every state. Because electoral
districts are apportioned based on census data and not the number of people voting, a state would not
lose any congressional seats because a higher percentage of their population was disenfranchised
through machine errors. Furthermore, because we have an Electoral College voting system, and the
popular vote is meaningless in presidential elections, disparities in error rate would not impact a
state’s influence on the presidential election. In other words, many of the “one person, one vote”
arguments discussed in this paper would be cured by standardization at the state level, and there
would be no extra benefits from nationwide standardization in terms of one’s statistical impact on an
election. Furthermore, the nation might benefit from varying technologies in different states because
there would be an incentive for companies to develop more accurate machinery, thus winning
additional state contracts. Ideally, machines will some day have a zero percent error rate. This day is
far off, but national standardization might not encourage the development of new technologies. Of
course, these arguments all revolve around the practical impact of one’s vote and not the abstract
value of having one’s vote counted, thus some of the arguments in this paper could certainly suggest
that nationwide standardization is the only constitutional system.
17

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Philip Elman, Colloquy: Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987); Michael A. Berch,
Symposium, We’ve Only Just Begun: The Impact of Remand Orders from Higher to Lower Courts on
American Jurisprudence, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 493 (2004).
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SYLLABUS
Thus far this article has suggested that the quick resolution of the 2004 presidential
election helped unify the nation and did not provide a forum in which the courts could review
and clarify the Supreme Court’s controversial and factionalized decision in Bush v. Gore.19
PART I examines the current state of voting technology in the United States and argues that
statewide variation in technology is problematic in a democracy. PART II of this article explores,
albeit briefly given the large amount of litigation in this area, the Supreme Court’s “one person,
one vote” standard that has been used as a template for reviewing election laws and disparate
treatment at the ballot box, and argues that using voting machines with different error rates is a
violation of this standard. PART III demonstrates that the worst machines in a state are often
found in districts with a large proportion of racial minorities and economically disadvantaged
areas, suggesting that the racial impact of the variation should elevate the level of scrutiny the
use of these machines receives. Although this article is primarily concerned with the impact of
Bush v. Gore, PART IV briefly examines the possibility of a Voting Rights Act challenge to
voting machines. PART V examines some of the key law suits that have been brought since Bush
v. Gore challenging the use of disparate voting machines. PART VI draws a connection between
dicta in the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore20 and the famous “all deliberate speed”21 order after
Brown v. Board of Education,22 and suggests that despite the expense and logistical difficulty of
standardizing voting machines within a state, the lesson of Brown is that when a judicial order is
so important that it goes to the core of equal protection values, the Court should not give any
19

See 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
21
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that the District Courts should proceed
with “with all deliberate speed” in its implementation of Brown I) [hereinafter Brown II]
22
See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20
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leeway to the states to take their time in changing policy. PART VII summarizes the arguments
made in this article and concludes by making recommendations to the Court.
PART I. THE PROBLEM: VARIATIONS IN VOTING TECHNOLOGY
In today’s elections, voters’ ability to impact an election varies depending on the type of
voting machine used in their locality.23

According to Election Data Services, which has

monitored election administration for the last twenty years, there were six broad categories of
machines used by counties in the United States during the 2004 election: punch card,24 lever,
paper ballots, optical scan, electronic, and mixed equipment.25 Political Scientists and legislators
have documented significant differences in error rates for each type of machine, but voters do not
choose which type of machine they will use to vote.26 The determining factor behind which type
of machine is used within a locality is largely a combination of funding, politics, number of
voters per polling place, and the standards set by state law.
There are a number of reasons why the intent of a voter entering a voting booth might not
be reflected in what is eventually tallied by the election administrator and sent to state officials.
Although some of these reasons might be attributed to election fraud by the onsite administrator
23

For a discussion of the various problems associated with different types of voting machines, see
Stewart v. Blackwell, Amicus Curiae Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Verified Voting
Foundation, and Votersunite! and Citizens’ Alliance for Secure Elections, available at
http://www.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/20040805_Ohio_Amicus_Brief.pdf.
24
Kerry might have brought a legal action in Ohio based on the use of punch card balloting had the
final vote count been slightly closer. Prof. Dan Tokaji found that: “Overall, there were a total of
94,488 residual votes in Ohio’s November 2004 presidential election. Of those, the substantial
majority (76,398) were cast using punch card equipment.” The total residual votes, even if
completely for Kerry, would not have turned Ohio “blue.” See Dan Tokaji, How Did Ohio’s Voting
Equipment
Fare
in
2004?,
Feb.
8,
2005,
available
at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comment0208.html.
25
“New Study Shows 50 Million Voters Will Use Electronic Voting Systems, 32 Million Still with
Punch Cards in 2004,” Election Data Services, Press Release, available at
http://www.electiondataservices.com/content/votingequipment.htm.
26
See Eric A. Fischer, CRS Report: RL30773: Voting Technologies in the United States: Overview
and Issues for Congress, March 2001.
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or poll workers, this article does not seek to address these problems.27 State and federal law
already deters, punishes, and seeks to rectify the fraud associated with these types of errors.28
Rather, this article discusses two general categories of voting frustration caused or enhanced by
voting technology: (1) errors when the voter votes, and (2) errors caused during the counting
process.
First, the type of machine impacts one’s ability to overvote, undervote, or make an
unintended choice,29 for example:
Lever machines can prevent overvoting through the use of interlocking
mechanisms that prevent a voter from pulling a lever for more than one
candidate for a given office. Electronic systems can prevent overvoting
through an electronic equivalent of such a mechanism. Some marksense
systems can reduce overvoting by permitting a ballot to be checked by the
tabulator (sometimes called a “smart ballot box”) before submission and
indicating if there is an overvote; the voter can then be given a new ballot.30
Although there are no machines that absolutely prevent an undervote, since voters are not
required to vote for every office on the ballot, some machines indicate the races for which a voter
has not selected a candidate, thus providing the voter with an opportunity to correct his
“mistake.” These machines, often electronic, force the voter to make a conscious decision to
27

For a discussion of voting fraud in recent elections, see Lori Minnite & David Callahan, “Securing
the Vote: An Analysis of Election Fraud,” available at http://www.demos-usa.org/pubs/EDR__Securing_the_Vote.pdf.
28
See Disputes and questions linger 3 weeks after presidential vote; Election 2004, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, A1, Nov. 25, 2004 (noting that “state officials regulate elections and the Justice Department
prosecutes voting-rights violations and election fraud”).
29
See Fischer, supra note 26, at CRS-8 (“There are three basic kinds of error that a voter might
make: overvote, undervote, and unintended choice. An overvote is a vote for more candidates for a
particular office than is permitted, such as voting for two candidates for President, and is usually
considered an error. An overvote on a ballot item invalidates the vote for that item. An undervote is a
vote for fewer than permitted, such as voting for no candidate for President. An undervote may or
may not be an error -- a voter might, on the one hand, have tried to vote for a candidate but was
unsuccessful in marking the ballot unambiguously, or might, on the other hand, have chosen not to
vote for any candidate. An unintended choice is inadvertently voting for a candidate other than the
one intended”).
30
See id.
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leave a section of the ballot blank.31 Unintended choice was a large problem in the 2000 election
in Florida; most notably, the infamous “Butterfly Ballot.”32 Although machines generally cannot
warn a voter about an unintended choice, since the machine cannot possibly know the voter’s
intention, machines that allow for misalignment of ballots may cause more of these errors, and
voting technology that allows a voter to review his selections prior to submission would help
reduce them. In all these ways, the type of voting technology that is used greatly impacts the
accuracy of the manifestation of one’s intention.33
The second broad category of error caused by a machine is created by the counting
mechanism associated with each machine. This category is arguably more problematic since the
voter has often left the polling place before her vote is tallied and the error is often attributable to

31

It is true, that even if the warn-and-correct technology is part of the machine’s package, it is still
subject to human error. In Florida during the 2000 election some election administrators did not
understand the function or never turned it on. See Walter Mebane, The Wrong Man is President!
Overvotes in the 2000 Presidential Election in Florida, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS, September 2004.
32
See id.; see also Steven J. Mulroy, Substantial Noncompliance and Reasonable Doubt: How the
Florida Courts Got it Wrong in the Butterfly Ballot Case, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 203 (2003);
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1201 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It was stated in the Palm Beach recount
request that the particular configuration of the ballot in that county (the so-called ‘butterfly ballot’)
had confused Palm Beach’s voters, producing two bad results: a substantial number of votes were
disregarded because more than one choice was punched in the presidential race; and some voters may
have inadvertently voted for someone other than their true choice”).
33
After the 2000 election debacle, I purchased a voting machine that had been used by a Florida
polling site that utilized punch-card ballots, the ballots that caused the problems with “hanging
chads.” In fact, I found many chads littered around the machine’s packaging. After having watched
months of controversy and litigation regarding the standard that should be used to count these ballots,
I was surprised to find clear instructions attached to the inside of the machine telling voters that they
must fully punch through the card before submitting their ballot. Although there could have been
additional safeguards to ensure that voters fully punched their ballots, the voters were not without
instruction or warning if they failed to vote properly without leaving “hanging chads.”
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a machine/technological failure, not human error.34
Consider an automated assembly line at an American factory. If all of the machines
operate perfectly, then a perfect product will emerge at the end of the line. But, as is true of
almost anything with an automatic function, there is an error rate. Some miniscule percentage of
products will emerge from the assembly line with imperfections. In business, manufacturers
factor in this error rate and understand that they will have to take a loss on some number of
defective products. In vote counting, failing to count these “defective” votes may significantly
impact a close election.
Different tabulation error rates have been associated with each type of machine,35 for
example:
In the 2000 elections, 53.4 percent of California voters used punch-card
machines, while the remainder used DRE or optical scan technologies. The
punch-card machines suffered error rates of 2.2 percent, more than twice
that of the other technologies. Thus, for every 10,000 votes cast in a punchcard county, approximately 200 were discarded; in the other counties, fewer
than 100 were lost to machine error.36
34

These two categories are largely intended as guideposts as this paper discusses types of errors. It is
not clear which category some errors fall into. For example, consider the “hanging chad” in Florida.
This system was problematic at the time of voting since the technology failed to allow the voter to
make a clear selection and did not warn the voter of potential errors, but it was also problematic
during counting since the counting technology did not count many ballots that would have been votes
if counted by a human. See Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore
and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 393, 393-94 (2002) (“The
hanging chad became a running joke, a symbol of everything that was wrong with a process that had
been badly bungled and was now running amok, and which was irretrievably corrupt. The skepticism
that met the canvassing boards was ferocious. Indeed, to many around the country - whether in favor
of or against recounting, whether Democrat or Republican - the pictures of individuals sitting at card
tables in gymnasiums trying to decipher punch-card ballots were simply not consistent with their
vision of American democracy at work”).
35
See Residual Votes Attributable to Technology: An Assessment of the Reliability of Existing Voting
Equipment (2001), The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, available at
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~voting/CalTech_MIT_Report_Version2.pdf; Fischer, supra note 26, at
CRS-11.
36
Marshall Camp, Note, Bush v. Gore: Mandate for Electoral Reform, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 409, 436 (2002).
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Furthermore, a state’s decision to tabulate the votes at the precinct or county level further
impacts the number of errors.37 Indeed, given the closeness of today’s elections, “the difference
between the numbers of votes cast for the two leading candidates may be less than the error rates
in the balloting and vote counting processes and machinery.”38 The wide variation in voting
machines forces us to reassess what type of “equality” we want when it comes to the electoral
process.
UNSTANDARDIZATION
Currently there are six main types of voting technologies being utilized throughout the
United States.39 Each type of machine is associated with a certain error rate, and the error rates
vary significantly. Certainly in law, we accept a certain level of error in our proceedings and
standards. For example, in criminal cases, our standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This is not absolute certainty, and we recognize that it is not a perfect system.40 Indeed, rarely in
law do we find ourselves facing absolute certainty about any standard that is applied.41
However, we hope that our judicial standards are applied equally across race, socioeconomic
factors, and jurisdiction.
In the case of voting machines and the error rates the court accepts, there is not
standardization. Even across precinct within a locality, there may be very different machines and
procedures when one arrives at the polls. Analytically, the very fact that voting machines vary
37

See Brian Kim, Recent Development: Help America Vote Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 579, 586
(2003); Mebane, supra note 31, at 6.
38
Joseph W. Little, Essay: Election Disputes and the Constitutional Right to Vote, 13 J. LAW. & PUB.
POL’Y 37 (2001).
39
See Table 1, infra.
40
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Warns About Test for Reasonable Doubt, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1994, at B8.
41
See Richard D. Friedman, EVIDENCE, 3rd ed., 39-42 (2004).
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significantly across the voting body for a given election seems particularly troubling to our
notion of equality and “one person, one vote.” After all, equal access and the ability to impact an
election is the very basis of the Supreme Court’s continuous review of election laws and voting
procedures through the lens of the 14th Amendment’s equal protection clause.42
STANDING: DEFINING THE INJURY
Thus far, this article has demonstrated that certain voters have a greater likelihood that
their vote will not count as a result of the voting machines they use when they arrive at the polls.
Because this article lays out a constitutional challenge to the variation in voting machines, and a
challenge cannot go forward without establishing standing,43 it is important to more specifically
define the injury.44 As the Supreme Court has noted:
The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Second, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,
the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party
not before the court. Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely
“speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”45
No voter can know for sure whether or not their vote was counted; anonymity remains an

42

See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693-94 (1989) (noting “[e]lectoral systems should
strive to make each citizen’s portion equal”).
43
For discussion of standing in voting rights litigation, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276 (1998); Judith Reed,
Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court’s View
of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389 (1999); Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein,
Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996).
44
See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding The Right To An Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663
(2001) (discussing the tension in the caselaw between “the highly individualistic view of rights
developed by the Rehnquist Court and the group-based conception of harm evident in many other
areas of the law”).
45
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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essential part of the electoral process. Thus, after an election,46 no voter could argue that their
individual vote had not been counted as a result of the machine malfunction. But if the standard
was proving individual harm to a certainty, almost no vote dilution case could go forward: A
voter in a precinct where the pollworkers threw away all but one ballot when the polls closed
would have no redress in the courts under this narrow conception of standing. For this reason,
defendants in voting cases that challenge standing on the basis that a voter has failed to allege an
injury to his own individual rights have not succeeded on this ground:
Because the voting process is anonymous, it is impossible for any one voter
to know with more certainty that their intended votes were not counted. If
standing in cases like this one required more, then no one would have
standing to challenge a system with, for example, a 20% or 30% or 60%
residual vote rate, or a policy under which every tenth ballot was
systematically discarded instead of counted. Such results would be contrary
to both voting rights and standing law. Further, the injury here alleged, is
not the State’s failure to count any one person’s vote, but the higher
probability of that vote not being counted as a result of the voting systems
used, i.e., vote dilution. That injury is both provable and traceable . . . Vote
dilution as “directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is
sufficiently concrete and specific.”47
Indeed, the probabilistic injury, which has been demonstrated throughout this PART of the article,
is enough to establish standing, as is consistent with court decisions in other areas of the law.48
46

Some defendants in cases challenging voting mechanisms have even suggested that the case should
be dismissed on account of “mootness” because the case was either brought before an injury could be
shown or after the injury had occurred and the election could not be undone. These arguments have
been rejected. See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (refusing to
dismiss the case “on the issue of mootness”); Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding
that the claim was properly considered even though the litigation was filed one month after election
in question had occurred).
47
Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
48
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 61 n.10 (1976) (“Clearly there is no difference
for purposes of Art. III standing - personal interest sufficient for concrete adverseness - between a
small but certain injury and a harm of a larger magnitude discounted by some probability of its
nonoccurrence. If the probability of the more ultimate harm is so small as to make the claim clearly
frivolous, the plaintiff can be hastened from the court by summary judgment”); McGuffage, 209 F.
Supp. 2d at 895 (citing Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) and finding that voters had standing to
bring a challenge to the use of different voting mechanisms based on a probabilistic injury).
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This article repeatedly revisits and refines this description of the injury, but many courts have
found the injury, as described thus far, sufficient for the purpose of establishing standing under
Article III.49 Certainly, standardization of voting machines would remediate this injury. Of
course, even with standardization, there would still be a chance a vote would not be counted,
since no machine has a 0% error rate. However, the injury asserted here, in the equal protection
sense, is really the relative probabilistic chance that one’s vote will not count in comparison with
other voters in the same state. This is a definable injury with a remedial solution, and because
there is a definable injury and a remedial fix, the question that remains is whether the courts can
mandate this fix using the Fourteenth Amendment or Voting Rights Act.
PART II. “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE”
Throughout the last fifty years, the courts have routinely stepped in when fundamental
voting rights have been impeded. Election law is largely left up to the states, but according to
the Supreme Court:
[w]hen a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it
is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried
over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a
federally protected right. The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one
thing -- one person, one vote.50
The “one person, one vote” standard is repeated today throughout legal scholarship and has

49

See, e.g., McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (“Plaintiffs have standing to raise the claims
asserted”); Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (acknowledging the strength of the defendant’s argument,
but declining “the invitation to dismiss the case on standing”).
50
Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
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become a mainstream maxim when it comes to election policy.51 However, the words “one
person, one vote” do not appear in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution,52 the section the
Supreme Court has relied upon in formulating its “one person, one vote” standard, and its
strictness in application and scope are not always clear. The application of the “one person, one
vote” standard has evolved through the case law, and a better understanding of its development,
will facilitate this article’s discussion of how a legal challenge to variations in voting machines
could fit into the “one person, one vote” jurisprudence.
ENTERING THE “POLITICAL THICKET”
Historically, the federal courts stayed away from issues they perceived as political in
nature and were reluctant to review issues related to elections for fear of impeding on local
autonomy.53 However, the laissez faire period in the Court’s elections law jurisprudence has
long passed.54 Today, the courts decide many issues related to the election and rarely shy away
from reviewing the electoral process.55 Using equal protection analysis, the Court has said that
States cannot treat voters differently in three respects: (1) Right to cast a vote; (2) Right to an
equally-weighted vote; (3) Right to have vote counted.56 However, the Court is constantly

51

When American and Iraqi leaders recently developed election policy for Iraqi elections, many
analysts and even Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani argued that in order for the election to be fair, it must
operate on a one person, one vote system. See Robin Wright, President Hails Election As a Success
and a Signal, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 31, 2005, at A1. This demonstrates how universally
recognized the American “one person, one vote” principle has become.
52

U.S. Const. art. I, 2.
See Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (providing a number of justifications for the judiciary
staying out of political apportionment questions).
53
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See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. 98.

55

See Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“When contending parties invoke the process of the
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront”).
56
Camp, supra note 36, at 418.
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refining and expanding the amorphous “right to vote,”57 and “history has seen a continuing
expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country.”58 Recognizing that “[t]he right to
vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government,” the Court seeks to
attain greater equality in all aspects of the electoral process.59
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF “ABSOLUTE EQUALITY” IS NOT AN IMPEDIMENT
However, while striving to achieve greater equality in the electoral process, the courts
have been reluctant to require “absolute equality” when conducting their equal protection
analysis.60 In the reapportionment line of equal protection cases, the Supreme Court recognized
that despite even the most genuine efforts to create equality between electoral districts, other
factors would create some level of inequality. For example, the Karcher Court found that “[a]ny
standard, including absolute equality, involves a certain artificiality. . . [E]ven the census data are
not perfect, and the well-known restlessness of the American people means that population
counts for particular localities are outdated long before they are completed.”61 Applying this
reasoning to voting machines, one might conclude that the Court would be willing to allow a
certain level of inequality when it comes to error rates, and that we should just accept that there
are a number of factors that are uncontrollable, and machine error rate is just one of such factor.
However, as the Court recognized in Karcher, the distinction between apportionment inequality
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See id.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
59
Id.
60
See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (J. White dissenting) (“by extending Kirkpatrick
to deviations below even the 1% level, the redistricting plan in every State with more than a single
Representative is rendered vulnerable to after-the-fact attack by anyone with a complaint and a
calculator”).
61
Id. at 732.
58
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made by the legislature and imperfections in census data is that the latter “apply equally to any
population-based standard we could choose.”62
As one court recently noted:
Neither the federal courts, nor likely anyone, can guarantee to every eligible
voter in this country a perfect election with 100% accuracy. The courts can,
however, by enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, guarantee the equal treatment of voters
who attempt to have their votes counted, their voices heard.63
The error rates made during machine vote counting line up with the apportionment
inequality in Karcher which the Court found unacceptable, because the errors are tolerated by
the state, and do not strike evenly across jurisdiction. The Court recognizes that in all elections
there are certain uncontrollable factors that lead to “inequality,” it is the controllable ones that do
not “apply equally” across a population that must be weeded out through legislative changes and
judicial review. Disparate voting technology is one such controllable problem.
HAVING ONE’S VOTE COUNT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
“The United States Supreme Court has clearly stated that the right to vote is a
fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”64 If voting is a fundamental right,
then it would seem that having one’s vote count equally is a natural extension of this right, and
thus triggers strict scrutiny.

Although grounded in the 15th Amendment,65 not the 14th

Amendment, the Court in Gray v. Sanders specifically linked the right to cast a vote with the
right to have one’s vote counted:
62

Id.
McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
64
Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Common
Cause I]; see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (discussing the “close constitutional
scrutiny” for voting restrictions).
65
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 376 (“this case . . . does not involve a question of the degree to which the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature”).
63
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The Court has consistently recognized that all qualified voters have a
constitutionally protected right to cast their ballots and have them counted
at Congressional elections. Every voter’s vote is entitled to be counted once.
It must be correctly counted and reported. The right to have one’s vote
counted has the same dignity as the right to put a ballot in a box. It can be
protected from the diluting effect of illegal ballots. And these rights must be
recognized in any preliminary election that in fact determines the true
weight a vote will have.66
This linkage between the casting and counting of a vote is consistent with a long line of court
decisions.67
Bush v. Gore seriously enhanced the equal protection arguments with regard to vote
counting:
First, Bush establishes that state action regarding vote-counting is fully
subject to the equality principles it perceives inherent in the right to vote.
Second, Bush expands upon existing doctrine in defining those principles.
The opinion finds an equal protection violation in unequal treatment despite
the absence of any discrete and articulable voter “classification” (arguably
the pith of the Court’s voting rights doctrine prior to Bush), ignores whether
uneven treatment is intentional in assessing whether the Equal Protection
Clause is violated, and employs an elevated standard of review in assessing
purported justifications for any uneven treatment. The extension of
evolutionary equality norms to the context of vote-counting, combined with
a heightened standard of inquiry into purported justifications, represents the
essential equal protection “rule” of Bush.68
The fundamental right that must be protected according to Bush v. Gore is the right to an equal
valuation of one’s vote at all stages of the voting process: “[h]aving once granted the right to
vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
person’s vote over that of another.”69
66

Id. at 380.
See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (“the right to have one’s vote counted is as
open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box”); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941).
67

68

Camp, supra note 36, at 417.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-105. Note that the use of the term “arbitrariness” seems to suggest that a
lower standard of review should be applied. See Mulroy, supra note 32, at 374.
69
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One of the challenges made in Bushv. Gore was whether disparate manual counting
methods without uniformity violated the Equal Protection Clause.70 Similarly, a challenge to the
variation of voting machines would hinge on whether machines with different counting methods
without uniformity violate the Equal Protection Clause. Thus if one equates humans counting
votes in Florida after the 2000 election with voting machines, the legal challenges look basically
identical. Although one might question whether the Bush rule “actually applies to the mechanics
of vote-counting or whether it is limited to systemic concerns such as methods of election and
districting . . . Bush v. Gore seems to invite this analogy.”71 Thus, it would appear from the
language in Bushthat the use of different voting machines may violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Whether states can fashion a sufficiently compelling justification for continuing to use
such diverse technologies when they have defined different consequences for recording votes is
one of the “important questions of Equal Protection and the right to vote that Bush v. Gore now
opens up.”72
BUSH v. GORE APPLIES TO MACHINES
Some scholars have suggested, quite persuasively, that Bush v. Gore applies only to the
“expressive harm” caused by the public and poorly managed recount in Florida.73 Arguably, the
expressive harm caused by perceptions of illegitimacy due to the widespread publication of
stories about faulty machines and the reality that when minorities go to the polls to vote they are
more likely to see these faulty machines is just as large as the “expressive harm” discussed in
Bush. At the time of the holding, it is possible that the Court was less focused on the voting
70

See 531 U.S. 98.
Mulroy, supra note 32, at 371-72.
72
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 306-07 (2nd ed., 2002).
73
See Gerken, supra note 44, at 411.
71
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machinery than it was on the laughable manual recount process. However, most scholars and
courts have argued that Bush v. Gore applies to vote counting processes more generally, and that
even if it was not intended, the language of Bushis applicable generally to voting standards and
technologies, not just the specific expressive harm caused by the Florida recounts:
[The Supreme Court] has asserted a new constitutional requirement: to
avoid disparate and unfair treatment of voters. And this obligation
obviously cannot be limited to the recount process alone. The court
condemns the fact that ‘standards for accepting or rejecting contested
ballots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single
county.’ That criticism surely would apply to the variations in voting
machines across Florida, and, for that matter, to similar variations in all
other states. The court’s new standard may create a more robust
constitutional examination of voting practices.74
Bush was about vote counting procedures and inequality. The varied use of the Bush decision in
the last four years demonstrates that there is no general consensus on the applicability of Bush to
voting machines, but beyond its general limiting language, almost nothing in the opinion
suggests that it cannot be extended to vote counting mechanisms generally:75
Only Justice Souter writing in dissent advances justifications for the
distinction between recounting and balloting that seem, if not persuasive, at
least arguable. Souter suggests that local variety in balloting technology is
justified by “concerns about cost, the potential value of innovation, and so
on,” a claim that echoes the much less explicit reference by the majority to
“local expertise.”76
Certainly, without any explicit and convincing argument that that the language in Bushcannot be
applied to voting machines, the courts should, and have, broadly interpreted its application:
What is missing from the opinion is an explanation of why the situation in
the case is distinctive, and hence to be treated differently from countless
apparently similar situations involving equal protection problems. The
74

Samuel Issacharoff, “The Court’s Legacy for Voting Rights,” N.Y. TIMES, at A39 (Dec. 14, 2000).

75

See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 309 (2nd ed., 2002); see also “Subsequent Use of Bush v.
Gore in the Courts,” infra.
76
Camp, supra note 36, at 441.
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effort to cabin the outcome, without a sense of the principle to justify the
cabining, gives the opinion an unprincipled cast.77
This conclusion will be unpacked further below in PART V.
BUSH’S LIMITING LANGUAGE
In Bush v. Gore, the Court limited the precedential value of the decision by noting that
“[the Court’s] consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”78 The Court reasoned
that its decision should be limited because of the “many complexities” of equal protection
analysis,79 but even if one does not believe that Bush’s precedential value is limited, perhaps the
Court would be willing to cite its decision in Bush v. Gore in the context of voting machines
since the challenges to different counting procedures and different counting machines are so
similar.80 At least one court has already reasoned that the answer is that Bush v. Gore can, and
should, be cited in this context.81
Bush stands as more than just a fact-specific result, more than a
meaningless judicial coin-toss. Seven of nine Supreme Court Justices
77

Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium, Bush v. Gore: Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 765
(2001).
78
Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see William C. Smith, Bush vs. Gore: Evermore: Plaintiffs Use High Court
Voting Case in Other Lawsuits, ABA Law Journal, 87 A.B.A.J. 16 (May 2001), available at
http://www.pawalaw.com/assets/aba_journal_article.pdf.
79
Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; see Smith, supra note 78 (“the High Court seemed to be expecting a one-hit
wonder”).
80
See Elizabeth Garrett, Symposium, The Law of Democracy: New Issues In The Law of Democracy:
Democracy In The Wake of The California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 267 (arguing that “Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s prediction that Bush v. Gore was a “one of a kind case” was premature (or
perhaps wishful thinking)”).
81
McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (“Although the [Bush v. Gore] Court limited its decision to the
then present circumstances, the rationale behind the decision provides much guidance to the situation
in this case, which presents, as far as this Court can tell, a matter of first impression in this Circuit
and, indeed, this country. That question is whether a state may allow the use of different types of
voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy, or if such a system violates equal
protection”); see also Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 895 (9th
Cir.) (relying on Bush v. Gore), vacated by 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003).
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concurred on the equal protection holding, and if the Court insists on saying
something is so, then it is so. What the majority said, precisely, was
explained in a nearly 4,000 word, twelve-page per curiam opinion - an
opinion by which it and all other courts ostensibly are now bound in
interpreting the Constitution. Such a pronouncement by the United States
Supreme Court can not flippantly be ignored. Moreover, widespread public
approval of the Bush decision may do more to assure its long-term
legitimacy than will the firmness of its doctrinal footing.82
LEVEL OF SCRUTINY: A SEVERE INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE
As is true in any Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the court must determine what level
of scrutiny should be applied during review. For example, classifications based on race are
subject to strict scrutiny,83 classifications based on sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny,84 and
those classifications which affect fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.85 Although I
will consider the impact that race may have on a potential challenge later in this article, in the
wake of Washington v. Davis, disparate impact alone on racial minorities is not enough to trigger
strict scrutiny without intent under the Fourteenth amendment.86 Thus, any argument that strict
scrutiny should apply would probably have to be grounded in a fundamental rights line of
reasoning.
The Court has been somewhat ambiguous as to the level of scrutiny that should apply
when examining potential violations of the fundamental right to vote. Certainly, Bush has
82

Camp, supra note 36, at 411 [internal citations omitted].
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
84
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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See, e.g., Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that “[d]isproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations); see also Johnson
v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a state from using a facially neutral law to intentionally discriminate on
the basis of race”); but see Camp, supra note 36, at 425 (“By ignoring the emergence of intent-based
review, Bush wipes away another potential objection by clearly implying that intent is not a
requirement for an equal protection violation in the vote-counting context”).
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confused many constitutional scholars and lower courts that have looked to see what level of
scrutiny was applied by the Court. This is discussed further in PART V.87
Although Bushappears to address the fun damentality of the right to have one’s vote
counted,88 if the Court truly treated its opinion in Bushas unprecedential, then under the pre Bush jurisprudence courts could still apply strict scrutiny. In Burdick, a 1992 case, the Court
outlined the balancing of interests that it considered in determining whether to apply strict
scrutiny in the election law context:
Under this standard of weighing the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury against the constitutional rights sought to be vindicated, the
rigorousness of the court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state election law
depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens U.S.
Const. amend. I and XIV rights. Thus, when those rights are subjected to
“severe” restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law
provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon
the U.S. Const. amend. I and XIV rights of voters, the state’s important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.89
This methodology suggests that if the restriction is not “severe” enough, heightened review, or
the requirement of a “compelling importance,” do not apply.90 In the pre-Bushju risprudence a
challenge to disparities in voting machines would probably include a discussion of the severity of
the harm caused by the variation.91 However, any notion that the burden on the right to vote is
not severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny is strongly rebutted by evidence demonstrating the
large disparities that error rates and variation of technology have on individuals and communities
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See “PART V. Subsequent Use of Bush v. Gore in the Courts,” infra.
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105, 108 (referring to voting as a “fundamental right”).
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Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
90
See id.
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See id.
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with less accurate technology.92
FATAL IN THIS CASE: APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
Although strict scrutiny does not invalidate all laws,93 absent a showing of a compelling
state interest that is narrowly tailored, a law will be deemed unconstitutional.94 Unlike earlier
voting rights cases where the Court was forced to consider strong arguments from the State with
regard to the compelling purpose of a law being challenged, most of the arguments for
maintaining dissimilar voting technology are grounded in the practicality of replacing the voting
machines. States have made a number of procedural and constitutional arguments against the
application of heightened review, based on a lack of standing, and even based on the absence of
“invidious intent,” but if the court was at the point of applying strict scrutiny, the laws allowing
disparate technologies would almost definitely be struck down.95

In the face of a fixable

infringement, the Court should apply heightened review and force compliance.96
THE COUNTER-ARGUMENTS: COST AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
Even though a fundamental right is implicated, the costs of instituting standardization
would be unprecedented in elections administration and cannot be ignored in any considerations
of standardization.97 With the current budgetary problems facing state governments and the
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See id. (“when those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance”) [emphasis added].
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See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (reminding the parties that “strict scrutiny is
not strict in theory, but fatal in fact”).
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Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005).
95
See McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 900 (considering the main arguments that States make in
support of upholding their statutes).
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See Dillard v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 686 F.Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (finding
that in the face of a racial dilution constitutional violation “the selection of a plan with seven, rather
than five, single-member districts reflects a conservative remedy limited to only those measures
necessary to cure the violation”).
97
Sunstein, supra note 77, at 765.
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growing federal deficit, many political leaders would probably argue that American tax dollars
could be spent better elsewhere.98 Although this argument might suggest that the courts need to
order standardization, since Congress and the legislatures will not, it is also a somewhat
convincing justification for a gradual move to better, and more standardized, voting technology;
rather than a complete overhaul prior to the next election cycle.99 This may ultimately rest on a
public policy consideration by the Court, but given that the election is the focal point of
American democracy, “replacing voting systems that deprive individuals of the right to vote is
clearly in the public interest.”100
As was described above, election administration has traditionally been left to local
autonomy.101 Thus, if Congress or the courts entered the “thicket” of voting mechanisms, one
might argue that they had overstepped the powers of the federal government.102 However, this
argument seems extremely unlikely. If there is one lesson from Bush v. Gore, it is that the
federal courts will not hesitate to get involved in elections and any exit from the “political
thicket” would be difficult for the courts at this point.103 Certainly, there is no reason to believe
the courts would restrain from involvement in a challenge to voting machines, when they have
become so deeply involved in the enforcement of equality in elections.104
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Id.
See “Part VI. Bush, Brown and Lessons Learned from “All Deliberate Speed,” infra.
100
Common Cause v. Jones, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the only
question was the feasibility of replacing the machines before the next election) [hereinafter Common
Cause II].
101
Sunstein, supra note 77, at 766 (considering the implications of Bush v. Gore on “longstanding
rules of local autonomy”).
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In summation, using the “one person, one vote” standard and applying strict scrutiny, the
courts should strike down any state law that does not require equal error rates in the voting
machines it uses. The disparity in voting machines is altering the likelihood that a vote will be
counted, thus violating that voter’s fundamental right to vote without a compelling justification
for doing so.105 This is consistent with other cases implicating a fundamental right,106 and with
previous cases where voting was found to be a fundamental right.107
At least one court has already suggested, even if strict scrutiny is not the standard, under
any standard of review, the use of disparate voting machines would be unconstitutional:
Even if the more lenient standard is ultimately applied by this Court,
Plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the Secretary of State’s permission
to counties to adopt either punch-card voting procedures or more reliable
voting procedures is unreasonable and discriminatory.108
After all, in the face of a blatant inequality, the two most proffered reasons for maintaining the
disparity in machines, cost and local autonomy, seem insufficient.
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See Bush, 531 U.S. at 105, 108 (referring to voting as a “fundamental right”).
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PART III. THE PROBLEM REVISITED: WHERE THE WORST MACHINES ARE FOUND AND AN
ARGUMENT FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Although it remains unclear whether the Court would accept a “mathematical equality”109
“one person, one vote” or fundamental rights argument as justification for requiring the
standardization of voting technology, the addition of a race-based argument would significantly
increase the pressure on the Court under the 14th Amendment:110 After all, when a system has a
“greater negative impact on groups defined by traditionally suspect criteria, there is cause for
serious concern.”111 There is significant evidence that the lack of standardized voting technology
has a disparate impact on urban and minority communities.112

This PART of the article

demonstrates this impact and examines the effect it should have on a legal challenge.113
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See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 258 (1962). But see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 (“We are
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work”).
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As new voting technology reaches the market, wealthy jurisdictions pride themselves on
providing it to their voters;114 but the poorer neighborhoods end up with the old, and less
accurate, voting machines that the wealthier neighborhoods pass down. As one journalist aptly
noted, “votes don’t spoil because they’re left out of the fridge. It comes down to the machines.
Just as poor people get the crap schools and crap hospitals, they get the crap voting machines.”115
Because the worst machines and technologies are employed in poorer jurisdictions and inner
cities where voting technology upgrades are not a high budgetary priority, the lack of an upgrade
hinders, in a statistically significant way, the effectiveness of the urban, and thus minority,
vote.116 Classes of voters who should be “similarly situated” are not being treated similarly.117
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
After the 2000 election, Rep. Roybal-Allard requested the first report at the national level
to investigate race and income’s connection to the number of undercounted and uncounted votes
in the 2000 election.118 The investigation examined forty congressional districts in twenty states;
twenty of the districts had high poverty rates and a large minority population, twenty had low
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poverty rates and a small minority population.119 The report made three significant findings: (1)
Voters in low-income, high-minority districts were significantly more likely to have their votes
discarded than voters in affluent, low-minority districts; (2) Better voting technology
significantly reduced uncounted votes in low-income, high minority districts; and (3) Better
voting technology significantly narrowed the disparity in uncounted votes between low-income,
high-minority districts and affluent, low-minority districts.120 Essentially, voters in low-income,
high-minority districts had worse machines and these machines caused more minority votes to be
discarded.121
The findings of the report are consistent with other studies of elections.122 In a recent
study of the racial gap in voting errors, Tomz and Van Houweling found that “the black-white
gap in voided ballots depends crucially on the voting equipment that people use.”123 They found
that the use of DRE and lever machines cut the gap in the voting errors by a factor of ten.124
Although they found that the machines were not the only factor in differences in error rates,
citing African-Americans’ propensity to intentionally undervote at a higher rate than Whites,
119

In order to create the sample of congressional districts, “information was obtained from the
Congressional Research Service” and the districts were selected based on the 1990 census data.
Districts were not selected if their boundaries had changed prior to the 2000 election. See RoybalAllard Report.
120

Roybal-Allard Report at i.
See Roybal-Allard Report.
122
See Mebane, supra note 31, at 3 (finding “[i]t is well established that throughout Florida blacks
and Democrats tended to be disproportionately a ected by voting problems”); see Stephen Knack &
Martha Kropf, Invalidated Ballots in the 1996 Presidential Election: A County-Level Analysis,
Working Paper, University of Maryland & University of Missouri, Kansas City (May 2001),
available at http://unofficial.umkc.edu/kropfm/invalidv.pdf, at 31 (finding “counties with more
African Americans and Hispanics have higher rates of invalidated ballots” and discussing similar
election studies); see also McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 899 (finding the variation is “impacting
African American and Hispanic groups disproportionately”).
121

123

Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap
in Voided Ballots?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Jan. 2003), at 58.
124
Id.
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they found that when machines were standardized, the gap was between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage
points,125 suggesting that standardization would basically eliminate any racial differences. Thus,
standardization would be one the easiest fixes to a serious state-supported racial disparity in
American history.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT + RACE = HEIGHTENED STRICT SCRUTINY?
The studies are enlightening and arguably unsurprising, but the current widespread
consensus in political science that voting machines dilute the minority vote suggests a breach of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The racial impact of a system that uses a variety of
machines is now certainly foreseeable.126 Indeed, although it is unlikely that intent on the part of
the legislatures could be shown,127 the combination of a fundamental right and race suggests that
an extremely high level of scrutiny should be applied.
Although the Court has historically separated its analysis of classifications and
fundamental rights as two separate strands of equal protection,128 when a fundamental right is
implicated, a classification in effect, not necessarily intent could be enough to further heighten

125

Id.
Cf. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 511 n.17 (1979) (“To add the word
‘foreseeable’ does not change the analysis, because the police department in Davis would be hard
pressed to say that the disparate impact of the examination was unforeseeable”).
127
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that “[d]isproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected
to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations).
128
See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
126
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the level of review.129 The use of the levels of scrutiny is formulaic, but in application, the levels
are extremely abstract and open to interpretation as to how they should be applied. When
considering race and voting laws the Court should be immediately suspect of any laws that have
a large disparate impact on a “discrete and insular” group’s ability to access the political
process.130
PART IV. A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Although this analysis of the constitutionality of the variation of voting machines focuses
on the implications of Bush v. Gore, and Bushdoes not focus on the Voting Rights Act,

131

any

analysis of the intersection of elections and race would be incomplete without a discussion of the
Voting Rights Act’s impact on a constitutional challenge.132 After all, the Voting Rights Act was
enacted to “ensure that minority voters no longer will have to raise their voices against judicial
tyranny,”133 and was the most important legislation passed by Congress during the Civil Rights

129

See id. at 114 (Marshall, J. dissent) (arguing that “[u]nder the Equal Protection Clause, if a
classification impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, . . . strict judicial scrutiny is required, regardless of whether the infringement was
intentional. As I will explain, our cases recognize a fundamental right to equal electoral participation
that encompasses protection against vote dilution. Proof of discriminatory purpose is, therefore, not
required to support a claim of vote dilution. The plurality’s erroneous conclusion to the contrary is
the result of a failure to recognize the central distinction between White v. Regester and Washington
v. Davis: the former involved an infringement of a constitutionally protected right, while the latter
dealt with a claim of racially discriminatory distribution of an interest to which no citizen has a
constitutional entitlement”).
130
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
131

See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (establishing up front that “[t]he petition presents the following
questions: whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential
election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to
comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses”).
132
See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 306-07 (2nd ed., 2002) (asking “[i]s there also a role for
courts in policing voting technologies, both before and after Bush v. Gore?”).
133
James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of
The Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 443, 611 (1999).
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Era. President Lyndon Baines Johnson called the Act “one of the most monumental laws in the
entire history of American freedom.”134 Despite lofty descriptions of the Voting Rights Act, the
Act’s applicability to the unintentional disparate impact on protected minorities created by a
statewide variation of voting machines is not unequivocal, and may reach beyond the scope of
Congress’ enforcement powers.135 In this PART, I argue that the Voting Rights Act should be
“interpreted in a manner that provides the broadest possible scope” and should be used by the
courts to standardize voting machines.136
SCOPE OF CONGRESS’ ENFORCEMENT POWERS
UNDER THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
The scope of Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments has been heavily litigated over the last decade with respect to the Voting Rights
Act.137 “[T]he Supreme Court has instructed . . . thatstatutes should not be construed to alter the
constitutional balance between the states and the federal government unless Congress makes its
intent to do so unmistakably clear.”138

Indeed, because there is no explicit standard for

determining whether an application of the Voting Rights Act would extend beyond the scope of

134

Ken Gormley, Essay, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When can Race be Considered
(Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 793 (2002).
135

Essentially, the applicability of the Voting Rights Act to this type of challenge could be framed by
asking the question: If Congress passed a bill to standardize voting technology at the state level, or
even at the federal level, would this action be beyond the scope of Congress’ powers? (Thanks to
Professor Katz for pointing out this structuring of the constitutional question.)
136

See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991).
See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that a number of recent
Supreme Court decisions have looked at the scope of the enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966)
(“States have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised. The gist of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of
state power. When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated
from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right”).
138
See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 104.
137
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congressional power:
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is. It has been given the power to enforce, not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would
be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the provisions of
[the Fourteenth Amendment]. While the line between measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and
Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the
distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law
support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of the
Amendment.139
Because the scope of the Voting Rights Act is often ambiguous, the Circuits have been divided
in some important areas of election law.140
Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act, under its enforcement powers, to
eliminate discriminatory practices based on race.141 As the Supreme Court stated in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach:142
The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of
racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in
parts of our country for nearly a century. The Act creates stringent new
remedies for voting discrimination where it persists on a pervasive scale,
and in addition the statute strengthens existing remedies for pockets of
voting discrimination elsewhere in the country. Congress assumed the
power to prescribe these remedies from § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
which authorizes the National Legislature to effectuate by “appropriate”
139

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
See Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945 (finding that whether Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act applies to felon disenfranchisement provisions has divided the Circuits);
e.g., cf., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d 102 (deciding that Section 2 did not reach New York’s felon
disenfranchisement statute) with Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding
that Section 2 applied to Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law).
140

141

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes
facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct”).
142
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301.
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measures the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in
voting.143
But because many states continued to enact discriminatory practices under the auspices of
neutrality with respect to race, “[i]n 1982, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
make clear that certain practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the
right to vote are forbidden even though the absence of proof of discriminatory intent protects
them from constitutional challenge.”144 Thus, the 1982 amendments relieved “plaintiffs of the
burden of proving discriminatory intent,”145 even though a plurality of the Supreme Court had
held in City of Mobile v. Bolden that the Voting Rights Act and Fifteenth Amendment had an
intent/purpose requirement.146 However, even as amended, “Section 2 does not prohibit all
voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect,”147 and just because intent
does not need to be shown, does not mean that disparate impact alone is always enough.148
Today, it certainly appears that a “state practice could survive Equal Protection Clause
scrutiny but fail Section 2 Voting Rights Act scrutiny.”149 Thus, it is an attractive platform for
challenging the use of different machines, should the equal protection argument fail.
A VOTING RIGHTS ACT CHALLENGE: WHY NOW?

143

Id. at 308.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 384; see also 42 USCS § 1973 (2005).
145
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 403.
146
See Bolden, 446 U.S. 55.
147
Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945; see Chisom, 501 U.S. at 383
(1991) (“certain practices and procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote
are forbidden”).
148
The vote dilution cases that used the Zimmer factors were not looking for outright intent, but they
were looking for something more than just a disparate impact when looking at the Zimmer factors
and the totality of the circumstances. This suggests that the Court’s history indicates there might be a
need to show something more than disparate impact. See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1973).
149
Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945.
144
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As we approach the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, the most obvious question raised by the possibility of a challenge to disparate voting
machines is: Why now? The courts have been particularly skeptical as to whether a challenge
falls outside the scope of congressional intent when the challenged practice was in place at the
time of the Voting Rights Act’s enactment, no specific mention of the practice was made at the
time of enactment, and no challenge was brought immediately after the Act was passed;150 after
all, the use of different voting machines has been commonplace over the last century, if this
practice was in violation of the Voting Rights Act, then why have not more challenges been
brought? There are two answers to this question: First, the Voting Rights Act has been used
before to challenge problems with voting technology, but the cases have usually garnered little
attention and been focused on a small geographic area.151 Second, many of the problems now
associated with voting technology have come to light since the 2000 election and with
advancements in technology.152 Of course, these two answers are not unconnected; ironically,
challenges to voting technology under the Voting Rights Act could not succeed on a large-scale
until the technology and modeling were in place to properly review and understand the
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Id. (discussing the role that the Voting Rights Act should play in the court’s review of felon
disenfranchisement laws in Florida, since construing the Act to invalidate felon disenfranchisement
laws might be “clearly contrary to Congressional intent”).
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See, e.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989).
See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, & Richard Pildes, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 311 (2nd ed., 2002); see also “The Problem: Variations In
Voting Technology,” infra.
152
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deficiencies of the system.153 Now that the courts can “identify and remedy the burdens,” a
challenge under the Voting Rights Act is more likely to succeed.154
ANATOMY OF A CHALLENGE TO DISPARATE VOTING
TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
“The essence of a claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973,
is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their
preferred representatives.”155 When scrutinizing a voting practice, courts generally look to the
“non-exclusive list of factors relevant to a claim under § 2” which were codified in the Voting
Rights Act:
[T]he history of official voting-related discrimination in the political
subdivision; the extent to which voting is racially polarized; the extent to
which the political subdivision has used electoral practices that tend to
enhance the opportunity for discrimination; whether minorities have been
excluded from any candidate slating process; the extent to which minority
groups bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health; the extent to which political campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; the extent to which minority
members have been elected to public office; whether there is a significant
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized
needs of minority groups; whether the policy underlying the use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or
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Even though this conclusion may seem ironic, it is not unlike what has occurred in recent
gerrymandering cases. As technology for finding inequality has emerged, the standards have gotten
more stringent. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Technology is both a threat
and a promise. On the one hand, if courts refuse to entertain any claims of partisan gerrymandering,
the temptation to use partisan favoritism in districting in an unconstitutional manner will grow. On
the other hand, these new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more
evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on the representational rights of
voters and parties. That would facilitate court efforts to identify and remedy the burdens, with
judicial intervention limited by the derived standards”).
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See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1528
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (looking at whether the punch card voting system denies blacks an equal
opportunity for participation in St. Louis).
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procedure is tenuous.”156
A plaintiff must show that there is a disparate impact on minority voters, but a disparate impact
alone, is not enough. In order to challenge a voting practice under “Section 2[,] plaintiffs must
show a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and the prohibited
discriminatory result.”157 In cases where the “causal connection” is glaring, the court does not
need to pay as much attention to the codified factors, as is consistent with Congressional intent
that “intent” not be a factor in Voting Rights Act inquiries:158 The Senate Judiciary Committee
Report “emphasized . . . that this list of factors was not a mandatory seven-pronged test; the list
was only meant as a guide to illustrate some of the variables that should be considered by the
court. As stated in the Report, ‘there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be
proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.’”159 Thus, any suggestion that a
challenge to disparate voting mechanisms does not fit perfectly into the Act’s “factors” is
rebutted by the strong “causal connection” that can be shown using the vast amount of data on
the disparate impact.
As this article described above, political scientists have demonstrated that minorities are
disproportionately affected by the disparities in voting machines, and that in any given election
minority voters are having their votes discounted at a much higher rate than white voters.160
156

Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306,
309-10 (3d Cir. 1994); see Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (“this list of typical factors is neither
comprehensive nor exclusive”).
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Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 312; see Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1117-19 (citing Ortiz and discussing the
different Circuits’ treatment of this “causal connection” inquiry).
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See Farrakhan, 359 F.3d 1116.
159
Gomez v. Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir. 1988).
160
Perhaps one of the advantages of bringing this claim under the Equal Protection Clause, as
opposed to the Voting Rights Act, is that in more homogeneous states a claim under the Voting
Rights Act might fail. Without a racial disparate impact, the Voting Rights Act claim would likely
be dismissed on the pleadings.
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Thus a finding of disparate impact is certainly supported;161 and there is a “causal connection”
between the use of disparate voting technologies and the disproportionate discounting of
minority votes. Minority voters have their votes discounted disproportionately because they
disproportionately reside in precincts using the worst machinery;162 were the machines
standardized, the disparate impact would disappear. Although no one could blame the machines
for the geographical polarization that has led to the disparate impact in discounted votes;
geographic homogeneity is the result of centuries of discriminatory social, economic,
governmental, private, and political practices that are deeply connected with the history of racial
bigotry in the United States. Because the use of different machinery by geography “interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality,” the practice violates the Voting
Rights Act.163
PART V. SUBSEQUENT USE OF BUSH V. GORE IN THE COURTS
In the four years that have past since Bush v. Gore,164 a number of suits challenging
voting practices and the adequacy of voting machines have been filed in state and federal
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See “The Problem Revisited: Where the Worst Machines are Found and an Argument for
Heightened Scrutiny,” infra.
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There is also some very undeveloped political and social science data suggesting that certain
machines even disproportionately impact Black voters when there is standardization because Blacks
tend to undervote/overvote by accident at a slightly greater rate than Whites when the machinery is
held constant. Although this paper has not sought to answer what possible changes should be made
beyond standardization, and standardization would help remedy the overall discrepancy greatly, this
area of research’s applicability to a judicial challenge should be explored further in the future. See
Michael Tomz & Robert P. Van Houweling, How Does Voting Equipment Affect the Racial Gap in
Voided Ballots?, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 47, No. 1. (Jan. 2003).
163
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
164
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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courts.165 Although many of these suits are quoted in this article and the arguments presented in
this article reflect their contributions to the caselaw, a few of these decisions are more explicitly
discussed in this section. As is true of many of the Court’s decisions based on elections and
voting rights law, the lower courts have struggled to apply Bush v. Gore’s amorphous
language,166 but as this PART demonstrates, their reliance on Bush in examining voting
mechanisms is significant in itself.
BLACK v. MCGUFFAGE
In Black v. McGuffage, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, scrutinized a
motion to dismiss in a suit seeking an injunction that challenged the use of punch card ballots
and the variation of voting systems at the county level, and examined “whether a state may allow
the use of different types of voting equipment with substantially different levels of accuracy, or if
such a system violates equal protection.”167 The plaintiffs, who were “Latino and African
American

voters

in

counties

throughout

Illinois,”

alleged

that

minorities

were

“disproportionately forced to use--and are disproportionately injured when they use--the
challenged voting systems.”168 Although the litigation did not ultimately play out in the courts
because the suit was settled after the motion to dismiss failed, the District Court’s discussion of
the motion is revealing.169
165

Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (finding that “[i]n the wake of the 2000 presidential election, several
suits, including the present action, were filed challenging the use of punch card ballots as violative of
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and/or the Due Process Clause.
Additionally, voters filed suits leading up to the 2004 presidential election challenging the adequacy
of the voting systems that replaced the punch card ballots).
166

See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (“Nor can it be said that the lower courts have, over 18 years,
succeeded in shaping the standard that this Court was initially unable to enunciate”).
167
168

McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
Id. at 891.

169

Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at n.8 (noting that Black v. McGuffage “was subsequently settled by the
parties”).
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The Court denied the Defendants’ motion with respect to the claims under the Voting
Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, and only dismissed the count
based on the privileges and immunities clause.170 Quoting Bush v. Gore, and analogizing to the
human ballot counting in Florida, the court found:
That people in different counties have significantly different probabilities of
having their votes counted, solely because of the nature of the system used
in their jurisdiction is the heart of the problem. Whether the counter is a
human being looking for hanging chads in a recount, or a machine trying to
read ballots in a first count, the lack of a uniform standard of voting results
in voters being treated arbitrarily in the likelihood of their votes being
counted. The State, through the selection and allowance of voting systems
with greatly varying accuracy rates “value[s] one person’s vote over that of
another,” even if it does not know the faces of those people whose votes get
valued less. This system does not afford the “equal dignity owed to each
voter.” When the allegedly arbitrary system also results in a greater
negative impact on groups defined by traditionally suspect criteria, there is
cause for serious concern.171
Not only did the court treat Bush v. Gore as precedential, but it also found that the harm
in Bushwent beyond an expressive harm, and directly implicated the use of varying voting
technology that created different probabilities that one’s vote would be counted. The court
explicitly found that by demonstrating a “disproportionate risk of having their votes not counted”
the plaintiffs had established an injury and thus had standing.172 Furthermore, the court found
that because this probabilistic injury impacted traditionally protected groups, the injury was
constitutionally problematic. Thus, Black v. McGuffage strongly suggests that Bush can be used
to challenge the use of disparatevoting technology under a number of constitutional provisions.
COMMON CAUSE v. JONES
In Common Cause v. Jones, the court denied the state’s motion for judgment on the
170

McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
Id. at 899 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 431 U.S. at 104-05).
172
Id. at 894 (“Probabilistic injury is enough injury in fact to confer standing in the undemanding
U.S. Const. art. III sense”).
171
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pleadings after the plaintiffs challenged California’s use of the less reliable punch card ballots
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act.173

In looking at the Fourteenth

Amendment challenge in Jones, the court looked at previous decisions by the Supreme Court to
try and find the correct level of scrutiny that should be applied. Ignoring the Court’s instruction
that Bushshould not hold precedential weight, t he District Court found significance in the
Supreme Court’s citation of Harper in Bushbecause that case adopted a “standard of at least
intermediate, and possible, strict scrutiny.”174 In looking at Bush, th e court was unsure which
level of scrutiny the Court had applied and found “that perhaps the Court was using a heightened
standard of scrutiny but also was finding the Florida recounts to be arbitrary and
discriminatory.”175 Thus, based partially on Bush, t he court found that the plaintiffs “alleged
facts indicating that the Secretary of State’s permission to counties to adopt either punch-card
voting procedures or more reliable voting procedures is unreasonable and discriminatory.”176
The Fourteenth Amendment challenge was allowed to move forward.
With regard to the Voting Rights Act challenge, the state argued that because the claim
did not fit the Gingles factors, it should be denied.177 However, the court rejected this argument,
finding that the Gingles factors apply to “apply to redistricting and vote dilution cases,” and that
a challenge based on the disparate impact of voting machines is more analogous to a voting
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213 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Common Cause I, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109; see Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
174
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Common Cause I, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
Id.
177
Id. at 1110 (“the three part test articulated in Thornburg v. Gingles: 1) the minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in single-member district; 2)
the minority group is politically cohesive; and 3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it usually to defeat the minoritys preferred candidate”).
176
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qualifications challenge and thus the test outlined in Gingles does not apply.178 The court was
convinced that arguments should proceed with regard to the Voting Rights Act and Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
Unfortunately, “[t]he issues in this case were subsequently rendered moot because the
Secretary decertified punch card ballots” for use in elections occurring after March 2004.179
However, due to the campaign to recall Governor Gray Davis in the summer of 2003, the battle
over California’s voting mechanisms was anything but moot.180
SOUTHWEST VOTER REGISTRATION EDUCATION PROJECT v. SHELLEY
In Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. Shelley, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc, would not allow a preliminary injunction based on the California’s use of different voting
mechanisms in the upcoming gubernatorial recall election of 2003.181 A circuit panel, relying
heavily on Bush, had previously found that the election should be postponed because the “choice
between holding a hurried, constitutionally infirm election and one held a short time later that
assures voters that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are
satisfied is clear.”182 The plaintiffs based their challenge on the equal protection clause and the
Voting Rights Act, and a circuit panel noted that they were likely to succeed on the “merits of
their equal protection claims.”183
The Ninth Circuit quoted Bush and held that because the question in Bush did not
implicate “whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different
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Stewart, 356 F. Supp. 2d at n.10.
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See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Id. at 912.
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Id. at 907.
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systems for implementing elections” an injunction was not appropriate because the plaintiffs had
not shown that there was a high likelihood of success that their challenge would ultimately
succeed.184 After all, in determining whether to impose an injunction, the standard of review
requires that the court speculate as to the likelihood that the plaintiffs will ultimately succeed in
their action.185 However, the Ninth Circuit did not say that there was not a constitutional
violation,186 or that machinery was not implicated in Bush, just “that plaintiffs will suffer no
hardship that outweighs the stake of the State of California and its citizens in having this election
go forward as planned and as required by the California Constitution.”187 In other words, in the
face of potential competing constitutional interests, the Ninth Circuit erred on the side of
allowing the election to proceed.188 The decision certainly did not foreclose future challenges to
the use of disparate voting technologies; in fact, the court hints that if the evidence of disparate
impact had been further developed at the time of litigation, a Voting Rights Act claim might
184

Id. at 918.
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have succeeded,189 and that Bushleaves open the question of whether an equal protection
challenge to the use of the machines would succeed.190
WEBER v. SHELLEY
In another case in the Ninth Circuit, Weber v. Shelley,191 the plaintiff argued that a “lack
of a voter-verified paper trail in the Sequoia Voting Systems AVC Edge Touchscreen Voting
System that [Riverside] county installed violate[d] her rights to equal protection and due
process” because that system was more prone to fraud.192 In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument
the Ninth Circuit applied a low level of scrutiny because their use was nondiscriminatory and
had only a minor impact on the right to vote. Quoting Burdick, the court found:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Under this
standard, the rigorousness of the court’s inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation
burdens Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, has been recognized when
those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But
when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
voters, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify the restrictions.193
Weber can be distinguished from the type of challenge recommended in this article in two
ways: First, no racial disparate impact was shown. The analysis in this article has suggested that
189

Id. at 919 (“There is significant dispute in the record, however, as to the degree and significance
of the disparity. Thus, although plaintiffs have shown a possibility of success on the merits, we
cannot say that at this stage they have shown a strong likelihood”).
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Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003).
192
Id. at 1103.
193
Id. at 1106.
191

CONN 43 OF 57

when race is implicated the standard of review should be heightened and the protections under
the Voting Rights Act can be triggered. Second, Weber was a challenge based on the possibility
of fraud, not on the possibility that a vote would not be counted. As was discussed above, there
are already laws in place to deal with and deter fraud, thus the justification for standardization in
this case was much weaker than the race-based challenge developed in this article.
STEWART v. BLACKWELL
In Stewart v. Blackwell, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio considered a
challenge that was more comparable to the one suggested in this article.194 A group of plaintiffs,
which included African-American voters, challenged the use of punch card voting and “centralcount” optical scanning devices under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause and the
Voting Rights Act.195 After reviewing the post-Bushcaselaw, the court determined that rational
basis review should be applied, and that the “primary thrust of this litigation is an attempt to
federalize elections by judicial rule or fiat via the invitation to this Court to declare a certain
voting technology unconstitutional and then fashion a remedy.

This Court declines the

invitation.”196 Indeed, in the Blackwell decision the court “declines the invitation” for some
extremely foolish reasons and the decision reads like a long excuse.
First, the court denied the Voting Rights Act claim because the plaintiffs only asserted a
“vote denial” claim and neglected to assert a “vote dilution” claim.197 While implying that the
vote dilution claim might have succeeded, the court dismisses any potential for success under the
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Voting Rights Act because the plaintiffs failed to call their challenge a “vote denial” claim.198
The court quickly notes that there certainly is no vote denial because minorities have not been
denied access to the polls.199 This seems like an excuse so that the court did not have to consider
what was obviously meant to be a vote dilution claim.
Second, the court finds that the “operation of different voting systems by different
counties within the same state does not amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”200
In making this finding, the court cites Bush v. Gore, but cites Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion,
not the majority.201 It seems strange that the court would rely so heavily on the dissenting
opinion of a case that was not even supposed to have precedential value.
Finally, in assessing where race fits into the challenge, the court considered a variety of
conflicting social science studies and concluded that “the highest frequency in Ohio of residual
voting bears a direct relationship to economic and educational factors,” not race.202 However,
the court fails to recognize that even though race did not match up perfectly with the numbers on
residual votes, the strong correlation between race and economic/educational, suggests that race
is implicated by the studies. Racial inequality, facilitated by economic/educational inequality, is
exactly the type of social and historical inequality that the Voting Rights Act was meant to
address. The court selected the study that would make it easiest to decline the invitation and then
applied an extremely narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act.203
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CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM LITIGATION AFTER BUSH v. GORE
This small survey of the cases that have most closely considered the arguments presented
in this article provides little guidance as to how the Supreme Court would come out were it to
examine the constitutionality of the variation in voting technology.204 Because these types of
cases are politically motivated and are either settled or dismissed without an opportunity for
appeal prior to the certification of the next election, they have not been litigated to their fullest
potential.205 However, there is one very significant common thread throughout these cases:
Each of these cases cites and relies heavily on Bush v. Gore and each court believes that Bush
applies to voting machines in some fashion. Even if this survey of cases does not convincingly
support an interpretation of Bushin favor of

standardization, it certainly suggests that the

Supreme Court needs to revisit its confusing analysis in Bush, because any prior expectation that
the lower courts will not look for meaning in its language, has been shattered at this point. Any
desire that the language of Bush v. Gore be limited to the 2000 election or any specific type of
voting rights challenge seems to have been overridden by the large amount of litigation in the
aftermath of Bush v. Gore in all areas of election law. As the Dean of Stanford Law, Kathleen
Sullivan, stated “[Bush v. Gore was] an invitation to lawyers across the country to bring an
avalanche of lawsuits claiming that [counting] people’s votes differently and with different rates
of error in different counties violates the equal protection clause.”206 Many scholars believe that
the lasting legacy of Bush v. Gore will be its “reinvigoration” of voting rights law:
The lasting significance of Bush v. Gore is likely to be the reinvigoration of
the line of cases from the 1960’s that deemed voting a fundamental right.
The court’s language has now opened the door for constitutional challenges
204
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of flawed election methods. The spotlight on Florida revealed just how
infirm the operations of elections are. The legacy of this case could be a
substantial jolt of justice into the voting arena.207
PART VI. BUSH, BROWN AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM “ALL DELIBERATE SPEED”
PART VI presents two significant parallels between Brown v. Board of Education and
Bush v. Gore that are not explored in the literature discussing these two landmark decisions.208
First, in both cases, the Court was forced to review two separate systems that seemed facially
equal with regard to the broad purposes of the systems, getting an education and placing a vote,
when in reality the impact of the systems seriously infringed upon the ends of that purpose.
Second, in each case, the Court recognized state action as unconstitutional, but provided weak
language that created little impetus for change. These two parallels are considered here because
the Court has an opportunity to learn from its mistakes in Brown, in remedying the constitutional
problems associated with voting technology presented in this article. Although this article does
not attempt to rehash the long and complicated history of school desegregation/integration,209 the
lessons of Brown and school desegregation should not be ignored, lest the judicial system repeat
its mistakes.
BACKGROUND ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
In 1954, the Court handed down what scholars consider the most important civil rights
207
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decision in American history,210 Brown v. Board of Education.211 Brown decided a collection of
challenges to school segregation based on race. Relying on strong social science data, the Court
found that although the schools had similar buildings, curricula, qualifications, and teacher
salaries, the doctrine of “separate, but equal” had no place in the public school system:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.212
The Court would eventually extend its reasoning in Brown to other areas of segregation and the
unanimous decision in Brown would change the nation.
SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL
Although not exactly state sanctioned segregation of the kind that existed in the public
schools before Brown, the variation in voting technology today is similar. Recognizing that
neighborhoods in America today are still extremely segregated, a parallel could be made between
the school system of the first half of the 20th century and voting machines today.
Looking at the broad entitlement implicated in Brown, the states argued that there was an
equal right to receiving an education. Furthermore, they were able to demonstrate that if the
doctrine of “separate, but equal” manifested itself in the educational system correctly, the
tangible outcome of receiving a quality public school education would result. Similarly, in the
case of voting, all voting technology provides an opportunity to cast one’s vote in the broadest
210

See Christopher P. Banks, Symposium Article: The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section
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[the Court’s] most important civil rights ruling”).
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sense. One can cast a vote no matter what machine is used, and if the machinery works perfectly
there is really no difference between machines.

However, the problem is that separate is

inherently unequal, because the chance of failure, whether in an education system or voting
machine, is not equal once there is a separation. This is the takeaway from Brown.
Unlike school segregation cases, where the Court had to look to social science data in
order to find qualities “incapable of objective measurement,” that were being provided unequally
by the segregated schools,213 in the case of voting machines, social science has provided
conclusive evidence that machines are creating inequality in voting. On tangible factors alone,
inequality can be demonstrated. Combining this with the large body of literature demonstrating
the somewhat intangible affect of minority vote dilution on political influence, it is easy to see
how the current system of voting machines is inherently unequal.
LESSONS FROM “ALL DELIBERATE SPEED”
In Brown, the Court overruled the “separate, but equal” doctrine214 which had buttressed
segregated schools throughout the United States, and without providing a decree for immediate
desegregation, left it to the lower courts and state government to implement the process.215
However, the Southern states did little to implement the Court’s changes, the courts refused to
strengthen the decision without further guidance from the Supreme Court, and ultimately
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“stagnation resulted.”216 As a result, Brown returned to the Supreme Court in 1955 for the Court
to decide how its first decision should be implemented. Faced with unwilling state governments
and a divided nation, the Court wrote in Brown II that the States, through the enforcement of the
District Courts, must desegregate with “all deliberate speed.”217
A few years later, in Cooper v. Aaron,218 after the Governor and the legislature of
Arkansas defied the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I, the Court affirmed its authority, and
forced Arkansas’ schools to desegregate. However, the decision in Cooperand the subsequent
history of school desegregation are a testament to the failure of the “all deliberate speed” “order”
from the Court.

Indeed, ten years after Brown I, “few schools were even marginally

integrated.”219 It was not until Green v. County School Board,220 that the Court actually said that
its decision in Brown required integration and had “teeth,” and it took two more decisions in
1969 and 1970, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education221 and Carter v. West Feliciana
Parish,222 to make it clear to the States that the Court meant what it said when it came to
desegregation and integration.223
Today, the Brown II “all deliberate speed” order is considered one of the greatest failures
of the Court during the civil rights era: “Both at the time of the decision and in subsequent
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appraisals, Brown II was criticized for delegating too much authority to the district courts and
relying unduly on state and local authorities.”224 In the face of a constitutional violation, the
Court bowed to State governments that did not want to desegregate, and failed to create a
timeframe that would counter the “massive resistance” to desegregation around the country.225
After all, if segregation was unconstitutional, it did not follow that the Court would allow it to
continue for any time period. The “all deliberate speed” order diminished the seriousness of the
constitutional violation and allowed the state governments leeway in their remedial efforts.
The Court must have known that its “all deliberate speed” order would not force
immediate state action.

Politically, given the public opinion of desegregation at the time,

without a strong order from the Court, state officials were savvy (and potentially motivated by
animus) in their decision to delay desegregation as long as possible.226 Additionally, given the
large cost of desegregating, busing students, and revising the entire educational system of a state,
the officials were constrained by considerations of practicality.
The lesson that can be taken away from the Court’s experiences with desegregation is
that in the face of a constitutional violation with racial implications, the Court must provide
language with “bite” to counteract the strong political, practical, and structural obstacles to
change. It is not enough for the Court to recognize a law or policy that is constitutionally
problematic; in order to seriously catalyze change, the language of the Court must be decisive
and guiding.
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“LIKELY . . . WILL EXAMINE WAYS”227
This is a lesson the Court did not heed in its decision in Bush v. Gore.228 In Bush, the
Court identified the variation in voting machines and said that “[a]fter the current counting, it is
likely legislative bodies nationwide will examine ways to improve the mechanisms and
machinery for voting.”229 There is a strong parallel that can be made between this language and
the “all deliberate speed” order in Brown. Both orders provide an ambiguous timeline for the
States to cure a constitutional violation.
In Bush, the Court indicated, but did not hold, that the use of disparate voting machines is
unconstitutional, and the Court did not immediately force the states to standardize.230 The
Court’s decision argued that:
The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the
franchise to choose electors for the President of the United States. Equal
protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted
the right to vote on equal terms, the state may not, by later arbitrary and
disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another. It must be
remembered that the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.231
As described above, almost any reading of this language suggests that voting machines with
disparate error rates are unconstitutional. By counting a vote on a machine that has a high error
rate in comparison to other machines in the state, a state dilutes the value of that person’s vote,
thus contradicting the language of this passage. But the Court did not state outright that the
States needed to standardize their technology, rather it said the States “will . . . likely” examine
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this issue.
Most likely, the Court was surprised by the vast amount of political science data that was
presented to them throughout the arguments and briefs in Bush v. Gore on the variation of voting
machines and its impact on elections. Because much of the statistical studies of voting machines
would be close to impossible without computers and a wide network for sharing data across
states, the nascent research in the area of voting machines became more prominent in the months
leading up to the 2000 election, and certainly immediately following the election. Thus, the
Court may not have considered voting technology as a potential equal protection violation prior
to its decision in Bush v. Gore. In Bush, had the Court held outright that the use of varying
voting machines was unconstitutional, the already forming specter of illegitimacy over the
presidency in 2000 might have been too much for the country to handle. The entire election
system in every state would be invalid, and nationwide challenges under the new doctrine, might
have forced another election. Like the Court did almost fifty years earlier in Brown, the Court
chose the solidarity of a divided nation, and the practicalities of widespread change, over a
constitutional mandate that would have been difficult to implement immediately.
Just as the decision in Brown, without a firm mandate, was a “shot over the bow” to the
states to begin the desegregation process, the language implicating the voting machines in Bush
indicated to the States thatthey needed to thoroughly examine their voting machines. Just as the
change after Brown was mired in state politics, funding issues, and left an impacted class without
a substantial political influence with nowhere to turn but back to the Courts, changes to voting
technology in the states have been slow and the states, burdened with large deficits, have
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struggled to meet the standards recommended to them and those of HAVA.232 If Brown is an
indicator, the Court will likely be forced to revisit the issues discussed in this article soon, and in
the face of a constitutional violation, the Court should not tell the States to standardize machines
with “all deliberate speed,” rather it must provide an ultimatum, mandating change prior to the
next election.233
PART VII. CONCLUSION
John Hart Ely wrote, “[u]nblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial
review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of the vote seems the quintessential
stoppage.”234 As technology advances, new voting technologies will be utilized in American
elections. Although these new technologies provide for greater accuracy, faster voting, and
quicker results, as long as voting machinery is not standardized across a given State, some voters
will be left behind. There is significant evidence today that the voters being left behind are
disproportionately minorities in socio-economically disadvantaged areas. When the right to vote
is infringed, and especially when that infringement has racial implications, the courts must step
in to protect the equal protection rights of those affected. Under the Equal Protection Clause,
“we have seen the eradication of numerical malapportionment, the enfranchisement of minority
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voters, and the erosion of discriminatory electoral systems.”235 But just because our electoral
processes have improved and become more inclusive over the last fifty years, does not mean that
we cannot do better. Because the closeness of the 2000 election and subsequent studies of voting
technology have “brought into sharp focus a common, if heretofore unnoticed, phenomenon,”236
the Court has an opportunity to shape the law and institute change using its equal protection
jurisprudence. As we learned from Brown, in the face of a constitutional violation, the Court
must step in and not sit back and wait for the legislatures to act. No matter what the cost, it is
important that we commit the funds necessary to protect the democratic ideals that we purport to
advance. If Congress and the legislatures will not, the Court must.
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TABLE 1: UNITED STATES VOTING TECHNOLOGIES237
EQUIPMENT

DESCRIPTION

Paper Ballots

Candidates’ names are printed next to boxes which voters mark, on
large ballot forms that are counted manually. Because counting by
hand is time intensive, these remain in use mostly in small counties
with few contested offices.

Lever Machines

Each candidate name is assigned to a lever on a rectangular array of
levers on the face of the machines. The voter pulls down selected
levers to indicate choices. Interlocks in the machines prevent
overvoting.

Punch Card

Information about the ballot choices is provided in a booklet
attached to a mechanical holder and centered over a punch card,
which is inserted by the voter. To cast a vote, a stylus or other
punching device provided is used to punch holes at the appropriate
locations on the card, forcing out the inside of a pre-scored area in
the shape of a rectangle.

DataVote

In this variation on punch-card ballots, a stapler- like tool creates
holes on the card with sufficient force that pre-scoring of ballot
cards is unnecessary. Unlike standard punch card systems,
information on
candidates and ballot questions is printed directly on the DataVote
card, so it is easier for voters to ascertain after completing their
ballot whether they voted as intended.

Optical Scanning238

Large ballots similar to those of paper ballot systems are used,
allowing information about candidates to be printed directly on the
ballot. Voters mark their choices using a pen or pencil. Ballots are
counted by a machine that uses light or infra-red as a sensor to
discern which oval or rectangle the voter marked from a set of
choices. Some precinct-based scanning machines are programmed
to allow voters to check their ballots for overvotes.

Electronic Systems (DRE)

With electronic voting, voter choices directly enter electronic
storage, using touch screens, push buttons or keyboards. Machines
are typically programmed to prevent overvoting. The most common
models are “full faced,” showing all contests at once, like lever
machines, and a flashing red light alerts voters to the contests in
which they have not yet voted.
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TABLE 2: RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF VOTING TECHNOLOGIES239
TYPE OF MACHINE

POTENTIAL FOR
ACCIDENTAL
OVERVOTE

POTENTIAL FOR
ACCIDENTAL
UNDERVOTE

COST OF
CORRECTING A
MISTAKE

Punch Card

High

High

High

Central Optical Scan

Medium

Medium

Medium

Precinct Optical Scan

Low/Medium

Low/Medium

Medium

Level

Low

Medium

Low

DRE

Low

Low

Low
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